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1. Introduction 
Trust can be seen as the confidence an agent has about the behaviour of another agent. A 
trusting action is one that creates the possibility of a mutual gain and the risk of loss to 
oneself if that other agent deviates from what is seen as mutual beneficial. Clearly, this is not 
easy to measure and observe. Historically, is has been common to use a so called general 
social survey (GSS) to investigate trust. Naturally, there are many ways to go about in order 
to measure the trust of someone. The GSS approach is to simply ask individuals if they trust 
people or ask them to rate their level of trust. Another form is to represent an agent’s trust 
through money generating games. This thesis addresses the level of trust revealed through a 
money generating game known as the trust game and as the investment game. In the trust 
game the action of player one is interpreted as trust and the action of player two is seen as 
trustworthiness.  
 
The trust game origins from the field of game theory and is part of a relative new and 
growing research field in economics known as experimental economics. The trust game is 
one of the games utilized in the Malawi Land Tenure and Social Capital MLTSC1 research 
project. The game script for the Malawian trust game is given in the appendix. It is made by 
Abigail Barr and she has herself analysed the game in the rural parts of Zimbabwe, but the 
game structure origin from the article by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) - Trust, 
Reciprocity, and Social History.  
 
This paper examines the game theoretical prediction of the trust game. When observing the 
Malawian trust game outcome it becomes clear that well below ten per cent of the game 
participants is actually playing the game according to the theoretical game prediction, hence 
the Nash equilibrium is not satisfied. This finding is in harmony to the findings by both Barr 
(2003) and Berg et al. (1995). Further, there is argued by the use of various statistical 
calculations to be large geographical fluctuations with respect to how the game participants 
are playing the trust game, i.e.: players from different regions and villages play and 
cooperate differently in the trust game. It is also argued that individuals from poor villages 
                                                 
1 http://nacal.nibr.no/ 
  
2 
cooperate better in the trust game and they participate more in public cooperative works than 
players from relatively rich communities.  
 
In this paper there is asked if the behaviour of player two is affected by the action taken by 
player one. The results are ambiguous. It has proven difficult to establish significant 
apparent results at the individual level. Nevertheless, it is argued to be a connection between 
the probability of receiving a high offer and the how much money player one decides to 
entrust player two and this could to some extent be explained by the inequality aversion of 
player two in the game.  
 
This paper also examines the observed outcome in the trust game compared to what the 
players stated about trust before they participated in the game, i.e.: their survey answer 
versus their game behaviour. The empirical evidence is quite clear; there is a large 
inconsistency with regards to what the players say concerning trust and how they actually 
behave in the trust game.           
 
All calculations in this paper have been executed through the use of the statistical software 
Stata 9.1.   
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2. Theory and Prediction 
2.1 Introduction 
The trust game consists of two players. Before the game begins both players are given an 
endowment equal to s and are randomly drawn to be either player one or player two. Further, 
the players from the two groups are matched with each other. Thus, there are n/2 pairs in the 
game; where n is the total number of players. In the first stage, player one chooses an 
amount y, , which is given to player two. The amount given, y, is in the interim 
stage multiplied by a factor of three by the experimenter, and then handed over to the second 
player. This means that player two, before the second and final stage of the game, will hold 
an endowment equal to [ ]. In the last stage, player two is free to choose an amount 
z,  to send back to player one, hence player two derives a payoff equal 
to
sy ≤≤0
ys 3+
yz 30 ≤≤
zysP −+= 32π . Player one will take home zysP +−=1π  from the experiment.  
 
2.2 The Nash Equilibrium in a one shot trust game 
When calculating the Nash equilibrium, as normal in game theory, we assume perfect 
rationality and selfishness by the individuals. The trust game is of sequential character - in 
the words of Gibbons (1992):  
 
 “A Nash equilibrium is sub game perfect if the players’ strategies constitute a Nash 
equilibrium in every sub game…”  (page 124)2
 
And he argues: 
 
...”there may be multiple Nash equilibriums in a game, but the only sub game perfect 
Nash equilibrium is the equilibrium associated with backwards induction outcome.” 
(Page 59) 
                                                 
2The definition origins from Selten 1965 
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The sub game perfect Nash equilibrium in the trust game is equal to and . Since 
both players are rational and by definition selfish they would keep positive utility themselves 
rather than giving it up. Player one solves the game by backward induction and finds that he 
or she should propose zero to player two, because it is a known fact that player two is 
rational agent who maximize the private utility and if player one in fact makes a positive 
investment, he will loose compared to keeping the initial endowment, since player two does 
not return any positive amount. Consequently, player one sends zero and the game ends, 
since the rules of the game prohibit player two to return anything if the offer from player one 
equals zero.   
0=y 0=z
 
On the contrary, if y is of positive value, a pareto improvement occurs, if and only if player 
two sends back an amount equal or larger than the amount player one sent. If player two 
sends back an amount equal to the investment made by player one this implies that player 
one is as well off as by sending zero, but player two is better off, since the invested amount 
by player one is multiplied by a factor of three. If player two sends back a larger amount 
than the amount invested both players are better off compared to the game prediction. 
However, those two scenarios suggest different distributional issues. As well, if we look at 
the players’ joint utility, the best action by player one is to send his whole endowment, since 
the investment is multiplied by three.  
 
2.3 Empirical results from trust games 
Barr (2003) finds that actions taken by the game participants do not comply with the 
predicted Nash equilibrium, since the average amount given from player one to player two is 
greater than zero. The proportion of pairs that in fact are playing the sub game perfect 
equilibrium is less than 10 per cent for all the players in the sample treated in Barr. The 
mean rate of investment (the action taken by player one) in Barr’s paper are 0.52 and 0.4 in 
her two different treatments. The average returned amount by player two is 1.28 for both 
groups (measured as a proportion of the invested amount). About 70 per cent of the all the 
players in her paper gives back an amount that is equal or bigger than the amount they 
received from player one.    
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Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe – Trust, Reciprocity and Social History (1995) used 
undergraduate students in the U.S. in their trust game analysis. The results do not deviate 
greatly to the trust game analysis carried out by Barr. The average amount sent is 
approximately equal to half of the initial endowment, thus an investment rate about 0.5 and 
in coherence to the findings of Barr. Berg et al. (1995) observe that less than 10 per cent play 
the game’s theoretical equilibrium. Only 5 out of 60 sent the Nash equilibrium of zero, so 
neither this case, nor the case of Barr, concludes that the individuals are entirely selfish, 
since the predicted equilibrium of the game is not satisfied.  
 
2.4 The Dissatisfied Nash Equilibrium  
As mentioned, standard game theory assumes that the rationality and the selfish axiom holds. 
In the trust game the monetary payoff is defined as utility. However, in real life laboratory 
experiments the theoretical predictions do not seem to be satisfied. People may make errors 
of different kinds. They may calculate their payoffs in a wrong manner, they might not be 
totally convinced that the other players in the game are in fact really rational, they might 
misunderstand the rules of the game or they could have a utility function that deviates from 
the standard assumption, i.e.: their utility functions incorporate not only the private utility. If 
any of these assumptions are violated the game outcome deviates from the theoretical 
prediction. The fact that most people do not play the theoretical prediction of the game does 
not mean that they are by definition irrational; most papers written on the subject claim that 
the selfishness axiom is violated3. Experimental evidence shows a replicable pattern of the 
other regarding preferences of individuals. As Cox (2004) puts it: 
 
“…game theory incorporates the assumptions that agents do not care about others’ 
(relative or absolute) material payoffs or about their intentions.” (Page 260) 
 
This is followed by: 
 
“The part of the literature concerned with public goods experiments and trust and 
reciprocity experiments has produced replicable patterns of inconsistency with 
predictions of the model of self-regarding preferences. But this does not imply that 
                                                 
3 Amongst others: Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) 
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the observed behaviour is inconsistent with game theory, which is a point that has not 
generally been recognized in the literature.” (Page 261) 
 
People seem to have preferences, not only about their own utility, but also a concern toward 
others. In the trust game, this implies that an agent who is not playing the Nash equilibrium 
is not regarded as irrational, since the utility function of an agent could consist of factors 
such as inequality aversion or altruism, so called other regarding preferences. The level of 
social capital is also a factor of influence. Social capital is often defined as networks, norms 
and trust; however it has been normal through the last two decades to see social capital as a 
community level attribute (Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote, 2000). Repeated social 
interaction could be interpreted as social capital and some argue that social connection can 
be a substitute for a non existing institutional framework such as missing or expensive legal 
structures, which again could facilitate investments and financial transactions (Arrow 1972, 
sighted Glaeser et al. 2000). 
 
2.5 Definitions, Explanations and Empirical Work 
In standard economic theory it is usually said that individuals maximize their private utility. 
People have tradeoffs between different bundles of goods, such as consumption and leisure – 
these tradeoffs are referred to as an agent’s preferences. Some like consumption more than 
they enjoy leisure and vice versa. An important distinction is drawn between private 
preferences and social preferences. If you strictly care about the wellbeing of yourself, your 
social preference is by definition low. On the other hand, an individual has social preferences 
if he or she also cares about how the bundles of goods are allocated between themselves and 
others.  
 
An individual’s inequality aversion, altruism (so called other-regarding preferences) or the 
desire to be reciprocal are typically mentioned as possible explanations for the violation of 
the selfishness axiom in experimental games. Positive reciprocity is to reward 
generous/friendly actions by adopting actions that are of a generous character. We can thus 
define reciprocity as an action where you reply to friendliness with generosity and you 
punish hostile behaviour by not being generous, although you might get worse off yourself 
in the end. You have inequality aversion if you are willing to take costly action to prevent or 
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to reduce inequality. Altruism can be interpreted as pure kindness. If you are willing to take 
costly actions in order to make someone else better off, unconditional of previously 
behaviour by that other someone, you behave altruistic (Cox 2004). If an increased 
consumption gives individual A increase in utility, this concurs with the normal 
assumptions, but if individual A also gets utility increase if individual B’s consumption 
increases, her utility function accounts for altruism as well. Whether the choices or 
behaviour of an individual origin from other regarding preferences such as inequality 
aversion and altruism or from reciprocity is not easily observable (Cox 2004) and it is 
difficult to differentiate the separate effect of these factors. In most cases there are most 
likely combinations of numerous factors.  
 
The Malawi trust game is a one shot game and is played anonymously. In the words of Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995:   
 
“By guaranteeing complete anonymity and by having subject play the investment 
game only once, we eliminate mechanisms which could sustain investment without 
trust…” (Page 123) 
 
They mention contractual pre-commitments and reputation from repeated interactions as 
being eliminated mechanisms by performing a one shot game anonymously, thus the action 
of the players could be interpreted as a measure of trust. Stenman, Mahmud and Martinsson, 
2006, argue that it is some advantages to perform games, like the trust game, in a relative 
poor rural environment. The financial stakes has a larger consequence for the individual 
playing the game, thus they will have stronger incentives to do the “right” thing than a 
university student (given the same stakes and a substantial difference in income and wealth). 
Additionally, a sample consisting of players from the rural societies has a greater variation in 
the socio economic background amongst the players compared to what is normally treated - 
a population of university students from an industrialized western society (Stenman et al. 
2006).    
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2.6 The organization of the trust game in Malawi   
Upon arrival each participants is given an amount equal to 80 Kwacha (MWK)4, which is 
the Malawian currency. The following example is for illustrative purpose only. There are 
two players, player one and player two. Both players are given s = 80 kwacha as they arrive 
to the experimenter’s laboratory. The 80 Kwacha is available only in bills and everybody 
receives four twenty Kwacha bills each. They are then divided into groups consisting of first 
and second movers of the game. Player one makes his offer and decides to give half of the 
endowment to player two. The experimenter will thus add 80 kwacha in addition to the 40 
kwacha investment, so player two is before the last round endowed with the initial s=80 
kwacha plus the 3y=120 -  a total of 200 kwacha. For the sake of the argument, let us say 
that player two decides to give back 20 to player one and this ends the game. These 
circumstances give player two a payoff of 180 ( zysP −+= 32π ). The investor on the other 
hand does not gain on the 40 kwacha investment and returns quite desolated home with only 
60 kwacha ( zysP +−=1π ).   
Map and facts5 of Malawi: 
 
                                                 
4 All the amounts discussed in this paper is of the value MWK (if not otherwise stated) 
5 http://www.malawimacs.org/facts.htm 
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All the calculations in this paper arrive from a data set consisting of a total of 1766 
observations. The observations are derived by merging twelve trust games from the same 
number of villages. The villages are located in four different regions in Malawi. These 
regions are located in the south or the central part of the country. An observation is 
interpreted, unless otherwise stated, as a playing pair where a pair consists of two players. 
The variable reflecting the action of player one is referred to as invest and the action of 
player two is represented by the variables return and return_1.    
 
The trust game consists of 15 pairs in each game, so at the time where the data material is 
finalized, 540 persons have played the game. In each village there has been gathered 
additional survey data for about half of the players in each game, so in the final data set there 
will be a substantial amount of information concerning 270 players. The information about 
the players comes from a so called household head questionnaire and a household parcel 
questionnaire. The household head questionnaire, henceforth HHQ, concerns questions like 
household structure, different social capital questions, work, religion, education, schooling 
and more. The household parcel questionnaire, henceforth HPQ, was executed 
simultaneously as the HHQ and it asks the respondent to give the interviewer information 
about crop, production, land type, size, irrigation and more information with respect to the 
different parcels his family has to their disposal (not every household owns a parcel of land). 
 
                                                 
6 Originally, each game consisted of 15 playing pairs, but four pairs are not accounted for in the dataset. In the 
village of Mkwenya there are 13 pairs playing the game. In Katsukunya village one observation is omitted. The 
Chambwe village dataset is somewhat incomplete, including only 14 pairs. 
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3. Basic statistics 
3.1 Descriptive statistics  
When pooling the observations from the twelve games in Malawi, the following game 
statistics are given in table 1 and table 2 below. The variable invest refers to the amount 
invested by player one in the game. The mean amount invested by player one is 45.8, which 
gives an average investment rate of 45.8/80 = 0.5725. The variable return refers to the action 
taken by player two, and the variable value is the amount sent back to player one in the final 
stage of the game. 
  
Table 1 – Observed averages:  
Variable Obs Mean Min Max 
Invest 176 45,79 0 80 
Return 176 71,47 0 240 
 
Table 2 – Action of player one: 
Invest Freq. Per cent 
0 12 6.82 % 
20 38 21.59 % 
40 51 28.98 % 
60 37 21.02 % 
80 38 21.59 % 
Total 176 100.00 % 
 
Table 2 indicates that there are twelve players playing the prediction of the game, so about 
seven per cent of the first movers can be found at the sub game perfect equilibrium. About 
43 per cent of the players are giving away equal or more than 75 per cent of their initial 
show up fee and about 28 per cent are investing less than half of their show up fee.    
 
 
 
 
 
  
11 
Table 3 – Action of player two: 
Return Freq. 
0 13 
20 29 
40 32 
60 28 
80 14 
100 15 
120 19 
140 9 
160 12 
180 4 
240 1 
Total 176 
 
Table 3 tells us that there are 13 second movers who play the theoretical outcome of the 
game, zero. Compared to table 2, this implies that there is one player who receives a positive 
amount and returns nothing. On the other hand, notice that one person is actually returning 
as much as 240, which means that he or she returns everything he or she received.  
 
As table 1 points out, player two returns on average 71.5 to player one. Hence, on average, it 
is beneficial for player one to make a positive investment, rather than keep the initial 
endowment, since the average returned amount takes on a larger value than the average 
invested amount. 
 
Table 4 – Loss and gain: 
Variable Obs Calculation 
Invest 157 investreturn ≥  
Invest 98 investreturn >  
Invest 19 investreturn <  
       
The calculation in table 4 shows that 157 of the first movers do not lose by giving up a 
positive amount to player two. There are 98 (0.55) of the players that receive an amount 
which is in fact larger than the amount they sent. Finally, there are 19 of the 164, about 11 
percent, who loose by giving up a positive amount to player two, since the returned amount 
is smaller than the amount player one sent in the first place.   
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3.2 Trust game payoff  
The final average payoff for the two players is given in table 5. The distribution of the final 
payoff amongst the players in the dataset is distributed somewhat unequally. At least, if you 
compare it to the initial endowment they both received at the start of the experiment. Before 
the interaction begins, they both have 80, but as table 5 indicates, player two takes home a 
substantial part of the total pie.   
 
Table 5 – Trust Game Payoff: 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PayoffP1 176 105,68 36,9 20 240 
PayoffP2 176 145,9 50,29 80 300 
 
On average, player two has a payoff of 45 more than player one, which is more than half of 
the 80 they received before the interaction began. Notice as well the minimum and 
maximum values from table 5. The respective amounts tells us that the players with the 
lowest payoff of the first players pockets only 20 and the maximum value for player two is 
300, which gives us a factor of 15 between the least fortunate and “the winner of the game”. 
We can thus observe a substantial difference in the final allocation of funds amongst some of 
the players in the game.   
3.3 The Nash equilibrium outcome 
As mentioned, the theoretical prediction of the game indicates that both player one and 
player two should send an amount equal to zero. Based on the data from table 1 it is clear 
that the average invested rate equals 0.577 and the average sum sent back measured as a rate 
equals 1.568. Obviously, these numbers differ from zero. Table 2 shows that 12 players are 
investing zero and table 3 shows that 13 players are returning zero, thus well below ten per 
cent are playing the Nash equilibrium. Hence, since only twelve of 176 observations are 
located at the theoretical prediction, so this must be interpreted as evidence that a substantial 
fraction of the players in the Malawian games are not behaving according to the prediction.     
                                                 
7   
57.0
80
79.45 ==
endowment
invest  
 
8 
56.1
79.45
47.71 ==
invest
return  
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As in Barr (2003) and Berg (1995), only a small fraction (below 10 per cent) of the players is 
playing the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium. The number is actually even smaller for the 
players in our sample. The players in the Malawian games are both investing and returning 
more compared to the populations treated in both Barr and Berg.       
 
3.4 Findings and Discussion 
As normal in trust games, the players from the Malawi sample are not playing the predicted 
outcome of the game. The fact that the average player does not play the prediction of the 
game could origin from factors such as altruism, inequality aversion, norms, trust, networks 
and risk preferences. It could be a result of what the first movers expect of the behaviour of 
their fellow pair mate. As well, something that makes it even more difficult to segregate the 
reasoning behind the chosen amount by each player is that individuals could have different 
levels of altruism, risk preferences and inequality aversion. Additionally, individual 
characteristics such as gender, age, village of origin, income and social status could also 
effect the decisions taken by the numerous players.  
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4. Empirical investigation  
4.1 Behavioural explanation 
4.1.1 Introduction 
How do the former basic statistics relate to each other? Do the amount sent by player one 
influence the amount player two returns? If we try to explain the amount returned with the 
amount invested as our explanatory variable we are likely to produce a quite good fit, since 
the investment and the returning of money, by the sense of the game should incorporate a 
high degree of correlation. The amount given to player two is multiplied by a factor of three 
by the experimenter, thus the upper bound for the responses of the second player is directly 
influenced by the size of the investment made by player one. Instead there is created at a new 
variable which is a proportion variable. This variable is the amount returned divided by the 
amount invested and it is referred to as return_1 throughout the thesis9. This transformation 
is convenient for our regression analysis later on. A proportion variable will not inhabit the 
same properties as in the former case, since it’s upper bound is constant at three, and is not in 
the same way related to the size of the investment made by player one. In addition, the 
proportion variable has some useful interpretations. If the proportion is equal to zero, there is 
pure self interested money maximizing behaviour. If the proportion is equal to one, we have 
a case of pure reciprocity, where player two sends back an amount equal to the amount 
invested. If the value of the proportion variable equals two, we interpret this as pure sharing, 
where the two players divide the total amount of money in their pair equally amongst each 
other (As interpreted by Barr, 2003).   
 
Table 6 – Statistics player two: 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Return_1 164 1,569 0,72 0 3 
      
 
                                                 
9 
invest
returnreturn =1_  
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From table 6 it is obvious that player two sends on average back an amount 1.57 times larger 
than the amount invested by player one, thus player two are located in the interval between 
pure reciprocity and pure sharing. However, note that this number is only valid for the 
observations where player one makes a positive offer, thus the 12 observations where player 
one sends zero have been removed compared to the variable return.  
 
Table 7 – Correlation Matrices: 
 
 
The correlation matrix between the variable invest and the variable return confirms the 
suspicion with regards to the high correlation amongst the two variables, so it does seem to 
be true that the amount sent by player one is naturally correlated to the amount sent back 
from player two. A more interesting observation in table 7 is the correlation matrix on the 
right hand side. It indicates a poor correlation between the transformed variable return_1 and 
the variable invest, hence when there is made an adjustment for the amount sent by player 
one the correlation almost completely disappears. This indicates that the action taken by 
player one does not influence the proportion returned by player two.            
  
4.1.2 Generous, reciprocal or selfish? 
In the former section, the correlation matrix between invest and return_1 rejects that the 
amount invested influences the action of player two. Like that section suggested, it might be 
perfectly true that it does not matter for player two if player one entrusts him or her with a 
small or a large amount. However, the data from the former section could need a new set of 
eyes, since the results are not entirely convincing. There might be a case of type II error in 
our conclusions, i.e.: keeping the result when it is false.  More specifically, to reject a null 
hypothesis is a stronger conclusion than failing to reject it (Hill, Griffiths and Judge, 2000). 
So in order to pursuit the question concerning player one’s effect towards the behaviour of 
player two this section treats a transformed version of the variable return_1.   
 
As mentioned before, the action of player two is discussed and defined into categories. The 
responses of player two are located in an interval from zero to three, where the 
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trustworthiness increases in the variable value. Let us now take this one step further and 
define the offer of player two as being either high or low. Now, what is a high offer? Well, 
this can of course be defined in many different manners, but in this treatment the offer from 
player two is categorized as high if player one is better off than he would be if he had 
decided to send zero. Hence, the offer from player two is interpreted as high if the offer takes 
on a value which is strictly larger than one. Consequently, the dependent (based on the 
variable know as return_1) variable high is coded such that it takes the value 0 if the offer is 
smaller or equal to 1, thus taking the value 1 otherwise. Seen in comparison to the 
definitions explained earlier, an offer that is of a pure reciprocal character is not interpreted 
as being a high offer. This means that the definition of a high offer in this treatment is 
conditional upon an improvement of the game utility for player one, of course, player one 
must have made a positive investment in the first place, since this treatment does not include 
the cases where player one sends zero.   
 
Logistic regression is commonly used when the dependent variable takes on binary values, 
thus since the definition of high falls into the two different categories defined above is it to a 
large extent natural to use logistic regression. The logistic regression is based on the 
maximum likelihood estimator, MLE, and it is consistent and normally distributed in large 
samples (Rice, 1995). This is convenient, since this makes it possible to make use of the 
statistics and the confidence intervals in the normal manner (Stock and Watson, 2007). The 
population logit model of the binary endogenous variable high and the variable invest as the 
regressor is given in (1). 
 
(1) P (high= 1│invest) = F (α + βinvest) = )(1
1
investe βα+−+  , where F is the 
cumulative standard logistic distribution function. 
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Regression (1) – Logistic treatment: 
 
 
The estimated coefficients are probabilities. These are a bit tricky to interpret, so table 9 
below accounts for separate calculations treating the predicted probabilities. As one can 
observe from the regression output the p-value of the model as a whole equals 0.0071, which 
is an indication towards a significant model at least at the 95 per cent significance level. The 
p-value for the estimated coefficient β harmonizes to this suggestion by being equal to 0.008. 
This result indicates that the normal null hypothesis H0: β=0 has to be rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis HA: β ≠0 has to be accepted. This means that there is in fact a 
relationship between the endogenous variable high and the explanatory invest variable. Table 
8 states the predicted probability of positive outcome of the variable high conditional upon 
the four different values of the invest variable. The action of sending zero by player one is as 
said omitted, since this probability should by definition be equal to zero.  
 
Table 8 – Predicted Probabilities: 
Invest Prediction 95 % Conf.Interval 
20 0,4561 0,32 0,58 
40 0,5571 0,47 0,64 
60 0,6535 0,56 0,73 
80 0,7388 0,62 0,85 
 
    
As the estimated coefficient from the regression reports, there is a positive relationship 
between the amount invested and the probability of a positive outcome for the variable high. 
As evident from table 8, an investment of 20 gives a predicted probability of 0.4561 for a 
positive outcome of high. If player one invests 80 there is a predicted probability equal to 
0.7388 that the returned offer is a high offer. Hence, regression (1) and table 8 indicate that 
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there is a higher probability of receiving a high offer the more the players invest, since the 
predicted probability is increasing as the level of investment is augmenting. Of course, these 
results have to be interpreted with some prudence, since the confidence intervals are quite 
wide and to some extent are overlapping each other.   
 
4.1.3 Findings and Discussion  
The correlation between the variable invest and return_1 is almost non existent, which 
means that the variation in the variable invest does not explain much of the variation in the 
return_1 variable. However, when the variable return_1 is transformed into the variable high 
and treated endogenously, the results seem to be the other way around - there is in fact a 
relationship between the amount invested and if the offer sent back to player one from player 
two is of high or low value. However, due to the wide confidence intervals in the predictions 
from table 8 one should be somewhat careful when interpreting and deriving conclusions 
from this chapter.  
 
4.2 Game behaviour – Geographical differences 
4.2.1 Introduction 
In the data set related to the Malawian trust games there is information about which village 
each player belongs to, since the players have participated in a trust game in their respective 
village. As well, we know in which region these villages are located. The players in the 
game belong to twelve different villages and these villages are again located in four different 
regions. These four regions are located either in the south or in the central part of the 
country. Thus for the 176 playing pairs, there are information about what the players have 
played and which village and region each participant of the game belongs to. Consequently, 
a natural inquiry is pointed towards potential difference in behaviour within the trust game 
when adjusted for the players’ geographical origin. The rational behind this comes from how 
villages and regions differ in a number of aspects. Amongst other things, there could be 
segregated effects of the social structure, religion and education and these effects could be 
difficult to differentiate at the individual level. These factors could affect how much player 
one decides to give player two, since a person living in given society is most likely to be 
influenced by for example social norms or customs that prevail in this village or region.  
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Table 9 – Regional Overview: 
1.  Chidradzulu 
2.  Dzoole 
3.  Njombwa 
4.  Phalmobe  
4.2.2 Regional differences – data for player one 
Can the geographical differences explain some of the variation with respect to how much 
player one decides to send? The function (2) accounts for the behaviour of player one and 
use the player’s region as the explanatory variable. The regression function is treated 
according to the ordinary least square method. The regions have been coded as (0/1) dummy 
variables. The region of Chidradzulu, region 1, has been omitted and thereby being the 
reference region and the region that the other three regions are compared against. The 
regression output, however, is given in the appendix.      
 
(2) Investi = α+ βjregioni + εi, where j=2,3,4 and i=1,….176 
 
The only statistically significant parameter is the estimate for the region of Phalombe (region 
4) where the p-value corresponds to 0.047 and thereby is significant at a 95 per cent 
significance level. None of the other p-values for the estimated coefficients are significantly 
different from zero at the 95 per cent significance level. The R2 is quite low and equals 
0.0299, thus our model explains approximately three per cent of the variation around the 
mean of the endogenous variable. The F-test of the regression is equal to 1.76. This is a 
small number. The F-test executes the hypothesis: all the estimated regression parameters are 
equal to zero, H0: β2=0, β3=0 and β4=0 against the alternative HA: At least one of the β’s is 
different from zero. With three numerator degrees of freedom and 173 denominator degrees 
of freedom at a 95 per cent significance level the critical F-value FC equals 2.60, which is 
larger than the value from the regression output. Hence, since the F-test indicates that the 
model (2) is not significantly specified there is more interesting to investigate the 
geographical difference in playing pattern at the village level.  
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4.2.3 Player one behaviour - the village treatment 
The results from the former regression did not give a clear cut answer (due to the low F-test 
value) to our investigation concerning the regional variations in trust for player one, so it 
falls natural to extend the analysis by looking at potential variation in investment level at the 
village level. Table A2 in the appendix gives an overview of the different regions with their 
respective villages included. In each region there is data from three villages. Each village has 
a unique number, in order to easily differentiate them from one another when doing the 
statistical calculations.  The explanatory village variables are coded as (0/1) dummy 
variables, which means that the dummy variable takes the value 1 if the characteristic is 
present, 0 otherwise. Since there are twelve villages that could explain the variation in the 
amount sent by player one the function (3) is defined as below. The omitted variable is 
village one, Chambwe. 
 
(3) Investi = α+ βjvillagei + εi , where j=2,3,…,12 and i=1,2,…,176 
 
Regression (3) – OLS treatment: 
 
 
The constant of the regression equals 55.7. This value is the average invested amount in the 
village of Chambwe. The p-values of the estimated regression parameters conclude that 
seven villages have estimated coefficients that are significantly different from zero. All these 
estimated parameters are significant at the 0.1 level. This tells us that the average invested 
amount in village two, four, six and twelve do not deviate to a large extent from the average 
invested amount by player one in the village of comparison, Chambwe. Of the statistically 
significant villages, compared to village one, Dambulesi (village 3), Katsukunya (village 5), 
  
21 
Mdoda (village 7), Mkwenya (village 8), Mthambi (village 9), Mulambulo (village 10) and 
Murike (village 11) are the villages where the difference in the level of investment is most 
apparent. The R2 and the adjusted R2 indicates a that roughly 30 per cent of the variation in 
the investment about its mean can be explained by the village dummies. The statistical 
software reports an F-value equal to 7.22, which indicates that the model is properly 
specified10. From table A1 in the appendix the heteroskedasticity test reveals a p-value equal 
to 0.2726. This implies that the variances of the error term are of homoskedastic nature, 
since the null hypothesis is being kept at the 95 per cent significance level. However, the 
same table indicates that the error terms are not normally distributed.  
 
4.2.4 Regional differences – data for player two 
Seemingly, there is a difference in the playing behaviour of player one due to geographical 
dissimilarities - at least at the village level. It is quite obvious that there might as well be a 
similar relation for the segment of the second players. Consequently, this section investigates 
if the variation in the proportion variable, return_1, could be explained by the characteristics 
of being from different regions and villages. The action of player two, return_1, is in this 
treated as the endogenous variable. As before, return_1 consists of 164 observations. The 
names of the regions and the villages are similar as in the treatment for player one. The 
action of player one, invest, is also included in the function. The following function (4) is 
defined for the regional treatment and is carried out by the use of OLS. As for player one, 
region one is the omitted dummy variable and the region of comparison in (4). The 
regression output is given in the appendix. 
 
(4) return_1i = α+ βjregioni + µinvesti+ εi, where j=2,3,4 and i=1,….164 
 
As evident from the regression output there are two significant estimated parameters, β2 and 
β3, which are the coefficients for the regions known as Dzoole and Njombwa, respectively. 
Both are significant at the 95 per cent significant level, since both regions have estimated p-
values which are below this level of significance. The coefficients β4 and µ do not seem to 
influence the endogenous variable. The F-test value seems to be at an acceptable level, since 
it has a p-value that is close to zero; hence the model is interpreted as being specified 
                                                 
10 The F-test value is larger than the critical value for the F-distribution with 11 nominator degrees of freedom 
and 164 denominator degrees of freedom. 
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properly. The R2 and the adjusted R2 report values close to 0.1, thus the variation in the 
dummy variables explains about 10 per cent of the variation in the dependent variable 
return_1. The table in the appendix shows that there is evidence towards homoskedastic 
residuals, because the test reports a p-value equal to 0.5640, thus the error terms are 
interpreted as being of homoskedastic nature. The appendix also reports the Swilk test result. 
The Swilk test rejects that the error terms are normal distributed, since the p-value of the test 
almost equals zero.  
 
4.2.5 Player two behaviour - the village treatment 
As for player one, let us check if the village dummy variables could explain some of the 
variation in the independent variable return_1. Each of the twelve villages uses the same 
unique identification as in the player one analysis. The dummies are coded as usual (0/1). 
The action of player one is also accounted for in this section and is represented by the 
variable, invest. However, this creates a potential problem, since there has already been 
established that the invest variable is influenced by the village dummies. The statistical 
analysis in this section differs to some extent compared to the former regressions. When 
executing the regression function (5) in a normal ordinary least square treatment the 
computer software reports back evidence towards large fluctuations in the size of the 
variance of the residuals, thus the error terms seem to be heteroskedastic11. This has certain 
implications for the derived results with respect to the estimates, thus the regression output 
below reports and take use of so called robust standard errors in order to make the statistical 
data valid even though the error terms are heteroskedastic.   
 
(5) return_1i = α+ βjvillagei + µinvesti + εi , where j=2,3,…,12 and 
i=1,2,…,164 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 The least square estimates are no longer the best linear unbiased estimator, BLUE, hence the hypothesis tests 
and the confidence intervals that have taken use of these estimates could be misleading. On other hand, the 
existence of heteroskedastic variances is quite common encountered when doing research with cross-sectional 
data (Hill, Griffiths and Judge, 2000).  
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Regression (5) – OLS treatment with robust standard errors:  
 
 
Seven coefficients are different from zero at the 0.1 significance level. Six village dummy 
estimates and the parameter for the variable invest. Five of estimates for the village dummies 
take on positively values and only one village dummy coefficient is negative. The 7th 
significant parameter is the estimate for the invest variable and the estimate takes a non-
positive value. The F-test with 12 numerator degrees of freedom and 151 denominator 
degrees of freedom is reported to be equal to 8.52. This value is well within the significance 
margin, thus the model is said to be specified properly. From table A1 in the appendix   we 
see that the error terms are not normal distributed and thus violates the OLS regression 
assumption concerning normal distributed residuals.   
4.2.6 Findings and Discussion  
The statistical evidence for player one in section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 indicates that players from 
different regions and villages invest money in the trust game differently. Thus the fact that 
two players are from different places indicates that they have different investment behaviour 
in the trust game. The statistical evidence in section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 derives a similar 
interpretation for the action taken by player two. In the player two treatment the action of 
player one, the variable invest, is included as an explanatory variable. The invest variable is 
unable to account for much of the variation in the regional treatment. However, when the 
regional dummies are exchanged with the village dummies in section 4.2.4, the effect of the 
investment by player one is at a significant level, hence a marginal increase in the investment 
by player one has a negative effect with respect how much player two gives back.   
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4.3 The Sample 
In the last sections we have seen some regressions of the result from 12 different villages in 
the MLTSC project. There has been shown evidence of geographical differences with 
respect to how people play the trust game and this could thus be interpreted as the existence 
of different levels of trust and trustworthiness at the inter-village level. The trust game has 
been carried out in 18 villages throughout Malawi, but since this was carried through during 
the summer of 2007, all of these data are not yet available, because the MLTSC project has 
not yet accessed all the data from the all the trust games. Hence, our attention in this section 
is to be turned towards a smaller sample. The players in this sample are from six of the 
twelve villages from the former analysis, Chambwe, Dambulesi, Mkwenya, Chiphaphi, 
Kayaza and Katsukunya.  
 
Since there are 15 pairs in each game and half of the participants have been interviewed in 
each of the six villages this sample should have accounted for 90 observations, however due 
to unforeseen circumstances in the field of data collection the data set in this section consist 
of 39 first movers and 42 second players, 81 observations in total. This is a result of the fact 
that the interviewing was carried out before the trust game was played and some of the 
players did not have the opportunity to participate on the day where the game took place. 
Consequently, the next analyses have to divide the total 81 observations into two separate 
groups – player one and player two, since we do not necessarily hold survey data for player 
one and player two in the same pair. From the HHQ the game participants have been 
interviewed on several domestic issues. This section takes a closer look at two variables 
from this questionnaire. One variable is called coop and the other is referred to as trust. The 
coop variable origin from a question in the HHQ and was presented to the participants in the 
following way:  
 
“Have you or anybody in your household participated in any type of public works 
without payment in the last year, e.g. construction or maintenance of roads or 
buildings?” 
 
The other variable, trust, is based on the following question: 
 
 “In general, can most people be trusted?” 
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These variables are both coded as (0 / 1) dummies, since they both are yes/no responses, 
where zero equals no and one equals yes. They are in this section used in the effort of trying 
to explain the investment made by player one, previously referred to as the variable invest, 
and the action of player two, denoted as return_1. The only difference with respect to the 
earlier analysis is the sample size, so the name of the variables remains as they are.   
 
This section also accounts for the income of the players from the sample. Two variables are 
accounting for the income. These variables are the personal income and the average income. 
The income of the individual is referred to as the variable income throughout the paper and 
the average income is called income_1. These measures have been extracted from the HPQ 
and are not income per se, but do in fact refer to the total amount of land, measured in 
hectare, owned (or at least disposable) for the family of the person playing the trust game. 
The amount of land is thus used as a proxy for income. The average income, income_1, is 
the average income of the village in which the game has been played. The variable 
transformation consists of measuring the average income of an entire village. Since there are 
six villages in this treatment there are naturally six different average income values.  
 
4.3.1 The cooperation hypothesis 
The decision to participate in cooperative public works can arrive from numerous factors. An 
agent may be conscious towards the level of public goods and has a desire to contribute and 
to augment the amount this good within the village. However, the question is posed in a 
manner that one could believe that the decision to participate is voluntary. In the 
hypothetical sense, it might be true that the individual decision is of voluntary character, but 
if you do not participate you might get sanctioned in some way, so this variable could be 
interpreted as a contingent voluntarism. Nevertheless, in both of these cases, if you are 
attending public cooperation works and you are cooperating with your fellow villagers, thus 
it would be interesting to see if the people that have been participating in cooperative public 
works also are more cooperating in the trust game, i.e.: they are both investing and returning 
larger amounts than those who did not participate. 
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4.3.2 The trust hypothesis 
The hypothesis concerning the variable trust is relatively straight forward, since there is a 
direct relationship to the issue in hand and the inquiry of the question. Do you trust people? 
The idea towards the stated trust question is the following: If the game investor responds 
positively to the question about trust – he or she should also invest more of the total 
endowment, since the player states that “yes, in general I think most people can be trusted”. 
When including the trust variable the effect of what the participants answer before the game 
and the actual behaviour in the game is compared to one another. The same reasoning does 
not directly translate with regards to player two, since player two, when faced with the 
decision, already has been trusted, so the result here are more dubious, however a person that 
in general trust other people are perhaps more willing to give away a larger fraction of the 
total endowment in the last stage of the game. The latter could by far be questioned.   
 
4.3.3 The income hypotheses 
As mentioned above, there are two different variables that represent income, income and 
income_1. At the individual level one could imagine that families with large parcels of land 
most likely also have higher productions relative to the producers that have small parcels, 
hence they have larger income. However, most of the players that have been participating in 
the MLTSC project are so called subsistence farmers, i.e., they produce to cover their 
everyday consumption and do not produce agriculture products to sell on the market, but 
there might be inter-village trading of goods and services that are segregated from the 
conventional market. When indoctrinating the income issue it is quite simple, do players, 
who come from families holding large parcels of land, i.e.: have a large income, behave 
differently compared against agents who do no control large land plots? A normal argument 
from the microeconomic theory states that if your income increases and all other parameters 
remain constant you will demand more of all normal goods, since your relative purchasing 
power has increased. If we define trust as a normal good, individuals with higher income 
will on average demand more of this good than a person which has a lower income. 
Alternatively, a person who is holding a large income can afford to take greater risk with 
respect to the investment in the trust game.   
 
As mentioned, the average income is also utilised in the next couple of treatments. The 
average village income could be interpreted as a term of reference towards the opponents in 
  
27 
the game. Most people often know where they rank within the hierarchy of a community, 
thus the average income can be seen as a community level explanatory variable. It is 
perfectly possible that a person playing the trust game involves some reflection towards his 
opponents in terms of how well of they feel they are compared to others, so it is preferable to 
look at how this variable explains the action of both player one and player two. 
 
4.3.4 The model for player one. 
With section 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 in mind, the following function is defined for player one: 
 
 (6) investij = α +β1incomeij + β2income_1j + β3trustij + β4coopij + µij
   i = 1,..,39 j = 1,..,6 
 
As seen from the regression output below there are two omitted observations of the total 
3912. The variable invest is the endogenous variable and the variables income, income_1, 
trust and coop are defined as explanatory variables.     
 
Regression (6) – OLS treatment: 
 
 
Three of the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 0.1 
significance level. It is only the estimated parameter for the variable income that does not 
seem to be statistically different from zero. The effect of the three significant estimates relate 
themselves negatively with regards to the dependent invest variable, since the signs of their 
respective estimated parameters are all negative. The p-value of the F-test equals 0.0150, so 
                                                 
12 One player from Chiphaphi is missing in the final regression output, since the data for the variables coop and 
trust are missing for this player. Also, one player from Chambwe is omitted, because the value of the variable 
trust is missing in the data set 
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the model can be said to be significant at the 95 per cent level13. According to the R2 and the 
adjusted R2 the explanatory power for the model lies in the interval between 22 and 31 per 
cent. Table A1 in the appendix shows that the p-value of the heteroskedasticity test equals 
0.7913, hence the assumption concerning constant variances in the residuals is not violated 
and it is thus understood that the residuals are of a homoskedastic nature. However, the 
residuals are not normally distributed, as the same table in the appendix points out.  
Table 10 – Correlation Matrix: 
 
 
If many of the variables in the sample move systematic in the same direction, we say that 
these variables are collinear or multicollinear if several variables are involved. A rule of 
thumb is that one should be alert of potential harmful collinearity if the correlation between 
two variables is 0.8 or larger (Hill, Griffiths and Judge, 2000). The correlation matrix above 
explains the correlation amongst the explanatory variables utilized in the regression function 
(6). The correlation coefficient between the variables trust and coop takes a high value and is 
calculated to -0.7238. The other correlation coefficients seem to be at more appropriate 
levels. Since there are smaller amount of observations in this section compared to the earlier 
treatments and the variables are somewhat collinear two Ramsey RESET tests have been 
testing the model with respect to omitted variables. One is using powers of the fitted values 
of the endogenous variable invest and the other raise the explanatory variables in (6) into 
powers. Both p-values from table A1 in the appendix conclude that the model (6) does not 
have any omitted variables.   
 
4.3.5 The model for player two 
The model for player two is almost identical as in the case of player one, however the 
variable invest is added as an explanatory variable. The following function is specified for 
player two:  
 
                                                 
13 The critical F-value with 4 numerator degrees of freedom and 32 denominator degrees of freedom at the 0.05 
level of significance is smaller than 3.64. 
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(7) return_1kj = α + β1incomekj + β2income_1j + β3trustkj + β4coopkj + β5investkj + δkj 
 k = 1,..,42 j = 1,..,6 
 
In (7) the endogenous variable is return_1. Income, trust, coop and the investment by pair 
pate for individual k from village j and as well the average income of village j is included as 
regressors. Three observations not accounted for in the final regression output, since the 
statistical software drops the observations where variable values are missing14.  
 
Regression (7) – OLS treatment: 
 
 
All the coefficients are not statistically significant. The estimated regression coefficients for 
the variables trust and coop are significant at the 0.1 level of significance. The estimated 
parameters for the variables income and invest are not significant, since their respective p-
values have values of 0.782 and 0.992. The p-value of the estimated regression coefficient of 
the average village income variable, income_1, equals 0.223 and thus indicating that neither 
the variable income_1 is seen as significant at the 0.1 significance level. The p-value of the 
F-test equals 0.0198 and seemingly the specified model is significant at the 95 per cent level. 
The two R-square calculations indicate that about 22 to 32 per cent of the variation in 
return_1 is explained by the explanatory variables defined in the function above. From the 
table A1 in the appendix it is easily observable that the error terms are homoskedastic, the 
model has no omitted variables, but the residuals are not normal distributed.    
 
 
 
                                                 
14 There is one income variable missing for a player from Katsukunya. There is a player from Kayaza and a 
player from Katsukunya where the coop variable data is missing, thus there are a total of 39 observations in the 
regression output. 
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Table 11 – Correlation Matrix:       
 
 
The problem for variables that have the property of being collinear is that they do not 
provide sufficient information in order to separate their explanatory effect from each other, 
so the effect of one variable could in fact be accounted for by the wrong variable. As for the 
correlation matrix for player one, we see that the correlation coefficient for the variables 
trust and coop takes a quite large value, as well does the coefficient for the variable pair 
(income_1 , coop), however since all the correlation coefficients are smaller than 0.8, we do 
not interpret this as harmful correlation.   
 
 
4.3.6 Findings and Discussion 
In the model for player two the invest variable is included as an explanatory variable. The 
regression output clearly, as the correlation table 7 from section 4.1 did, derives to the 
conclusion that the invested amount does not influence the amount sent back to player one 
by player two. The variable coop relate itself negatively to the endogenous variables in both 
the model for player one and the model for player two. In both models the estimated 
parameter for the variable coop has a negative effect on the endogenous variables invest and 
return_1. 
 
The variable trust also relates itself negatively at a significant level to the endogenous 
variables invest and return_1 in the regression analyses from the last sections. This result is 
to some extent of surprising character, since people that state that they do in fact, on a 
general level, have trust in other people invest less than people that say that they do not have 
trust. On the other hand, the variable trust could to some extent be biased. It is not sure that 
the respondent actually gave the questionnaire his honest view about trust.     
 
In the model for player one there is a significant negative relationship between the average 
income variable, income_1, and the endogenous regressed variable invest. This finding 
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indicates that an increase in the average income within a village will in fact reduce the 
invested amount by player one. The same relationship does not exist at the significant level 
on behalf of player two. The individual income variable, income, does not influence neither 
the behaviour of player one nor of player two according to the regression outputs.   
 
4.4 Stated trust and cooperation  
From the former analyses there has been shown evidence that the cooperative variable coop 
and the variable for the stated trust, trust, which are both taken from the HHQ, are in fact 
negatively correlated with both the invest variable and the return_1 variable. This means that 
people who cooperate in public works do not seem to cooperate better in the trust game. As 
well, the players who have stated to have trust toward others do not play the trust game in 
agreement to this proclamation. These new findings consequently reveal additional issues 
with respect to the stated trust and cooperative public works. What could determine the 
decision to interact in cooperative works within the village? Who are the players that claim 
to inhabit trust toward others?  
 
There are two measures for trust in this paper, the trust game and the stated trust. These 
measures are travelling in different directions, since they are negatively correlated. 
Consequently, in an attempt to investigate these issues, the variables are rearranged with 
respect to dependency. This section treats the former explanatory variables coop and trust as 
endogenous variables in an attempt to clarify which factors it is that influence these 
variables. The effect from the variable trust and the variable coop were the same for both 
players, so they can be treated simultaneously, which means that we do not need to divide 
our 81 observations from the sample into two groups as was done in section 4.3, but they can 
be treated within the same analysis. Since both the coop variable and the trust variable are 
binary, thus only taking the values zero or one, a logistic regression framework is used. For 
both of the binary endogenous variables the explanatory variables are income for individual 
i, income, and the average income for individual i from village j, income_1. 
4.4.1 The cooperation model 
The population logit model of the binary endogenous variable coop where the variables 
income and income_1 is included as the regressors is given in (8). 
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(8) P (coop=1 │income, income_1)   
↕ 
  F (α + β1income + β2income_1) = )1_( 211
1
incomeincomee ββα ++−+ , 
where F is the logistic cumulative distribution function. 
 
Regression output (8) – Logistic Treatment:  
 
 
With regards to level of significance there is evident from the regression output above that 
the coefficient for the income_1 variable is the one that rejects the null hypothesis of being 
statistically significantly different from zero. The estimated parameter for the variable 
income has a p-value equal to 0.615, thus the data tells us that this variable does not to a 
large extent influence the endogenous variable coop. The value of the log likelihood ratio 
equals 28.64 and this indicates that our model is reasonable specified. The p-value of the 
model confirms this, since it is zero. The sign of the estimated parameter β2 is negative, 
which means that the average income relates itself negatively towards the binary endogenous 
variable coop. This implies that a marginal increase with respect to the average income leads 
to a decrease in the probability of coop taking a positive value. So in the villages where they 
have a relative low income they have a higher probability of participating in cooperative 
public works. This is seen better in the table 12 below which explains, in terms of predicted 
probabilities for the average income variable, income_1, how the probability of receiving a 
positive outcome of the coop variable is varying with the average income variable, 
income_1. However, it is worth mentioning the relatively large gap between the largest 
income value 2.91 and the rest of the value for the average income variable, both in 
predicted probabilities and in the variable values themselves.    
  
33 
Table 12 – Predicted Probabilities:  
 
4.4.2 The model for the stated trust 
In earlier treatments we have interpreted trust and trustworthiness as what the players are 
actually doing in the trust game and used information from the HHQ and HPQ surveys in 
order to explain their behaviour. As in the cooperation model, we distance ourselves from 
what the players in fact did in the trust game and instead concentrate towards their survey 
answer about their level of trust, since, they all have answered the question from the HHQ – 
In general, can most people be trusted? The logit model of the binary dependent variable 
trust where the variables income and income_1 are defined as the explanatory variables is 
given in (9). 
(9) P (trust=1 │income, income_1) 
 ↕ 
 F (α + β1income + β2income_1) = )1_( 211
1
incomeincomee ββα ++−+ ,  
where F is the logistic cumulative distribution function. 
 
Regression output (9) – Logistic Treatment:  
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The log likelihood ratio equals 19.80 and alongside a p-value approaching zero the model is 
interpreted as being properly specified. There is only one of the estimated regression 
coefficients which take a value significantly different from zero. This is the parameter for the 
average village income, income_1, since it has a p-value close to zero.  The estimate for the 
variable income is, as in the cooperation treatment, not significant at any reasonable 
significant level; hence it is the average village income that explains the variation in the 
dependent variable trust. As evident from the regression output above and the next table, the 
relationship between the endogenous variable and the exogenous average income variable is 
positive.   
 
Table 13 – Predicted Probabilities:  
 
 
The predicted probability of positive outcome of the dependent variable trust is increasing as 
the average income increases. This implies that people from villages with relatively large 
average incomes have a higher probability to state that they have a general trust toward 
others than otherwise. However, bear in mind from the table above that there is a large gap 
in the predicted probability between the highest value for the average income and the rest of 
the values, but this is a product of the large gap in the average income.  
 
4.4.3 Findings and Discussion  
The main findings in section 4.4 are based on the significance of the average village income, 
since the estimated coefficient of this variable has proven to be the statistically significant in 
both the cooperation model and the stated trust model. The findings show that there is a 
negative relationship between the endogenous cooperation variable and the variable 
income_1. There is a large gap in the predicted probabilities; there is nevertheless a 
downward sloping relationship between the two variables coop and income_1 from our 
  
35 
sample. This does not directly compare to the game behaviour of the players, but it is on the 
other side interesting to observe that people from villages where the average income is 
relatively small have a higher probability of participating in cooperative public works, i.e.: 
the players from our sample who origin from low income villages are to a larger extent 
participating in public cooperative works.   
 
In the stated trust model there has been shown evidence that the stated trust of an individual 
from our sample is influenced by the average village income in a positive manner, hence the 
probability that the variable trust takes on a positive value, i.e.: an individual states that he or 
she has a general trust in other people, is increasing in probability when the average income 
increases. Alternatively, people who come from rich villages have a higher probability to 
state that they have in fact trust in others. However, in both the cooperation model and in the 
stated trust model the same trouble appears. One of the observed values from the variable 
income_1 is relatively far away from the observed mean.  
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5. Findings and Discussion 
The theoretical predictions in chapter two assume that players are rational and selfish. With 
respect to the game solution by backward induction, the players should have been located at 
the sub game Nash equilibrium, zero. However, since the average amount sent and the 
average amount returned both differs from zero the game prediction is not fulfilled. This 
finding concurs to the general picture drawn by most experimental economists. Table 1, 2 
and 3 shows proof of reciprocal behaviour from player two and since the proportion given 
back to player one is between 1 and 2, the offer from player two lies in the interval from pure 
reciprocal and pure sharing, which agrees to the findings by for example Barr 2003. 
 
However, to completely identify the reasoning behind every player’s decision to not send as 
the game theory predicts is somewhat uncertain. If we still assume that the rationality axiom 
holds this implies a violation of the selfishness assumption. If so is the case, the action of the 
players could be explained by reciprocity or so called other regarding preferences such as 
altruism and inequality aversion. With respect to the behaviour of player one, it could be the 
expectation of positive reciprocity, thus that player one believes he or she can profit from the 
investment through trusting player two. If player two does not behave altruistic, it could be 
the case that giving makes him or her feel better, or that the utility function to some extent 
incorporates inequality aversion, contingent upon having been trusted. I A gives B a positive 
amount B might feel bad if he does not return anything to A. Finally, it might as well happen 
that the villagers are used to be part of a sharing society, hence the social capital in the 
society in which the players’ origin could explain the diverging empirical results compared 
to the game prediction.   
 
Section 4.2 investigates the game behaviour when it is adjusted for geographical differences. 
It is argued that there are large geographical fluctuations in how people behave in the trust 
game. From regression (2) we have seen that the players from region four have a game 
behaviour pattern that differs compared to the region of reference and the estimates for 
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region two and three do not differ to the reference region15. On behalf of player two, the 
endogenous variable return_1 and regression (4) report that region two and three differs 
from the region of reference and the estimate for region four is not significantly different 
from zero. This is exactly the reverse of the treatment for player one.  
 
The geographical fluctuations are also present in the village treatments. From the player one 
analysis, the data from regression (3) indicates that village three, five, seven, eight, nine, ten 
and eleven differs most relative to village one. When looking at the actions of player two, 
regression (5) emphasizes that village two, four, five six, ten and twelve have statistically 
significantly different playing pattern compared to the reference village, village one. Both 
the regional differences and the differentiated behaviour observed in the various villages 
indicate a differentiated playing behaviour with respect to geographical settlement.   
 
In every pure player two treatment there is accounted for the level of investment by player 
one. Do the action of player one influence the action of player two? The findings are 
somewhat ambiguous. The correlation between the invested amount and the proportion of 
the returned amount is weak. This can be seen in table 7 from section 4.1. From section 4.3 
where the smaller sample is investigated it is obvious that the variable invest clearly has no 
influence with respect to the action taken by player two and the regional player two 
treatment from section 4.2 shows as well convincing evidence towards a non-existing 
relationship between the variable invest and the proportional returned amount by player two.  
However, the evidence of the village treatment for player two from section 4.2 travel in a 
different direction. In that case, the variable invest influence the proportion of the returned 
amount. The sign of the estimated coefficient is negative and significant at the 0.05 
significance level.  
 
Section 4.1.2 treats the transformed variable high and defines a high offer from player two as 
an offer that improves the game utility for player one. The findings suggest a positive 
relationship between the variable defined as high and the invested amount by player one, i.e.: 
the predicted probability of positive outcome for the variable high is increasing in the 
investment of player one. Since the invested amount by player one is multiplied by a factor 
                                                 
15 Based on the F-test the model used in regression (2) is seen as being not significant, but it is nevertheless 
observable that the average invested amount in region four is substantially lower than the averages in the other 
regions. 
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of three, this finding could be interpreted as an aversion towards inequality on behalf of 
player two, since the total amount returnable for player two is increasing and the endowment 
for player one is decreasing when the investment by player one is augmenting.  
 
The cooperation hypothesis discuss if people who are cooperating in public cooperative 
works are better to cooperate in the trust game, i.e.: there should be a positive correlation 
between presence of the variable coop and the endogenous variables invest and return_1 in 
regression (6) and (7). The estimated regression coefficient for the variable coop is 
significant in both (6) and (7). However, the effect is negative in both cases, thus these 
findings do not support the cooperation hypothesis, but rather the opposite – the players that 
have participated in cooperative public works both invest and return less than those who did 
not participate, so there do not seem to be a fact that people that have participated in 
cooperative public works cooperate more in the trust game. On the other side, the variable 
coop might be better interpreted as an institutional variable. It is not necessarily a fact that 
the cooperation variable coop in fact is a voluntary decision and thereby not being a good 
measure of individual decision making.  
 
The stated trust hypothesis argues a positive relation between the variable trust and the 
endogenous variables invest and return_1 in both regression (6) and (7). However, the 
results indicate the opposite. There is a significant effect between the variable trust and both 
invest and return_1, but in both cases this relation is negative, thus a person saying that 
“Yes, I generally believe people can be trusted”, both sends and returns less than otherwise. 
If the actions taken by players in the trust game is in fact interpreted as the level of trust and 
trustworthiness for individual i and k – the results from the regressions clearly indicate an 
inconsistency between what the players say and what the players do in real life.   
     
The income hypothesis from section 4.3.3 argues that the demand for trust and 
trustworthiness is increasing with respect to income. For instance, if player one has a high 
income, he or she can afford greater risks in the game, since the game payoff represents a 
smaller fraction the total budget. Regression (6) shows a weak tendency towards a positive 
relationship between the variable income and the variable invest, but the estimate for the 
income variable is however not very robust and does not fall within the normal level of 
significance. The data from regression (7) does not indicate a similar relationship for player 
two. Consequently, this hypothesis needs more research and it would be especially intriguing 
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to observe how the estimate for the income variable is affected by an increase in the total 
number of observations.   
 
The independent variable income_1 relate itself negative to the endogenous variables invest 
and return_1 in both regression (6) and (7). The regression reports indicate a significant 
relationship for player one, but the relationship is however not significant in the player two 
model. Nevertheless, this implies that in the villages where the average income is relatively 
low the players both send and return larger amounts than in the villages where the average 
income is higher. This is interesting; since this indicates that the people from relatively low 
income villages are more trusting and cooperate better than the players from relatively rich 
villages.    
 
From regression (8) and (9) there is shown that the average income variable, income_1, plays 
an important part. From the cooperation treatment in (8) the effect is negative at a significant 
level, thus stating that the probability of someone participating in cooperative public works 
is decreasing in the average income. This means that in the villages where the average 
income is low the predicted probability of participating in these kinds of programs is higher 
than in the villages where the average income is larger, which implies that there is more 
public works cooperation in relatively poor villages than in relatively rich communities. 
Seen in comparison to the sample treatment from section 4.3, these findings are fascinating. 
Regression (8) and (9) indicate that the players from the poor villages are more cooperative, 
since they are to a larger extent participating in public works and regression (6) and (7) argue 
that players who origin from poor villages both invest and return more, since the variable 
income_1 is negatively correlated to the dependent variables in both (6) and (7). 
Consequently, people from villages where the average income is relatively low cooperate 
more in public works and better in the trust game than villagers from relatively rich societies.    
 
From the stated trust treatment carried out in regression (9) the correlation is opposite 
compared to the cooperation model. The average income variable, income_1, and the 
endogenous binary trust variable are positively correlated, so the stated trust in low income 
communities seem to be lower than in the communities where the average income is higher. 
From regression (6) and (7) there is proven a negative effect on behalf of both the invested 
and the returned amount in the game from the stated trust variable trust. The stated trust 
model in regression (9) shows that players from the villages with the largest incomes are 
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more probable to state that they have a general trust towards others. This means that players 
from villages with high average income say they have trust, but as the evidence from the 
Malawian trust game has revealed, those are not necessarily the players who are the most 
trusting in the trust game, since the evidence from the various regressions tells us that the 
players from the low income communities are better to cooperate in the game. Consequently, 
there is not a strict coherence between what the game participants state and how they 
actually act in the trust game.  
 
Much recent theoretical and empirical work has evidence of trust between people foster 
cooperation and economic activity and is crucial for economic and social development. 
Glaeser et al. (2000) combined GSS and the trust game but found a poor correlation between 
the stated trust in the GSS and the amount invested by player one. By comparison, the 
amount returned was significantly explained by the stated trust in the GSS. In recent research 
it seems to be other motivations beside trust and trustworthiness that should be considered, 
such as pure altruism and risk preferences (Cox 2004, Karlan 2005, and Schetcher 2006), 
since people have different risk preferences and most likely different levels of altruism.  
 
Stenman et al. (2006) conclude that both measures (give and return) reflect trust, but none of 
them measure this especially well. However, this is not an isolated issue for the measurement 
of trust and could also be found other research fields. The conclusion of Stenman et al. 
(2006) is derived because they happen to observe from the results of stage one in the trust 
game that about one third of the players think that they will gain from sending a positive 
amount and approximately one third believe they will lose by giving away a positive 
amount, yet, they still sent a positive amount to the second player of the game, so there must 
be something else other than pure trust present in the decision making.  
 
This paper concurs towards some of the findings by Glaeser et al. (2000) and Stenman et al. 
(2006). It has proven difficult to determine decisive determinants which influence the 
decision making at the agent level, since most of the variables at the individual level do not 
seem to affect the action by the players. On the other side, geographical differences and 
alongside geographical characteristics such as average village income has proven to be 
important factors in this paper, i.e.: the social capital of a group might disclose more with 
respect to the trust game behaviour compared to individual characteristics.   
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7. Appendix 
 
Regression (2) – OLS treatment: 
 
(2) Investi = α+ βjregioni + εi, where j=2,3,4 and i=1,….176 
 
 
 
 
Regression (4) – OLS treatment:  
 
(4) return_1i = α+ βjregioni + µinvesti+ εi, where j=2,3,4 and i=1,….164 
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Table A1 – Regression Diagnostic tests:  
 
Regression 
Number 
P-value of 
heteroskedasticity 
test 
Error terms are 
homeskedastic
P-value 
of 
normality 
test 
Error 
terms are 
normal 
distributed
P-value 
of the 
RESET 
test,lhs 
P-value 
of the 
RESET 
test, rhs 
The 
model 
has no 
omitted 
variables 
2 0.3253 yes 0.00045 no N/A N/A - 
3 0.2726 yes 0.00019 no N/A N/A - 
4 0.5104 yes 0.00004 no N/A N/A - 
5 N/A N/A 0.02859 no N/A N/A - 
6 0.7913 yes 0.14918 yes 0.2325 0.8172 yes 
7 0.5106 yes 0.53191 yes 0.6037 0.9922 yes 
 
Comments: 
Test for heteroskedasticity16       H0: Constant variance, Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg 
Test for normality17    H0: Normal distributed error terms, Shapiro Wilk, Swilk test 
Ramsey RESET test18          H0: Model has no omitted variables, The RESET test gives two 
different p-values, the p-value for the left hand side (lhs) and the p-value for the right hand side (rhs) 
 
Table A2 – Region and Village: 
1. Chidradzulu    
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
Mulambulo
Mthambi
Kajawo
.10
.9
.4
2. Dzoole            
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
Mkwenya
Kayaza
Katsukunya
.8
.6
.5
3. Njombwa        
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
Dambulesi
Chiphaphi
Chambwe
.3
.2
.1
4. Phalmobe        
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
Namarwa
Murike
Mdoda
.12
.11
.7
 
 
                                                 
16 Obtained by typing the command hettest in Stata 9.1 
17 Obtained by typing the command swilk in Stata 9.1 
18 Obtained by typing the command ovtest and ovtest, rhs in Stata 9.1 
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THE TRUST GAME SCRIPT 
[Note to researchers:  Be sure to read the general instructions that you always read before a 
game (see below).  Group 1 players and Group 2 players should be separated in two 
rooms/locations before you begin this game.  The risk of collusion in the holding room is greater 
in this game due to the tripling effect and warrants the trade-off.  First instruct the Group 1 
players to put their offers in envelopes, then take all of their envelopes.  Ask them to wait while 
you play with the Group 2 players and then call back the Group 1 players to pay them off.  
Remember that there is no show-up fee with the trust game because both sides are given the 
same initial endowment.] 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Thank you all for taking the time to come today.  This game may take 3-4 hours, so if you think 
you will not be able to stay that long without leaving please let us know now.  Before we begin I 
want to make some general comments about what we are doing here today and explain some 
rules that we need to follow.  We will be playing a game for real money that you will take home.  
You should understand that this is not [insert name of researcher]’s own money.  It is money 
given to [him/her] by [his/her] university to use to do a research study.  This is research—which 
will eventually be part of a book; it is not part of a development project of any sort.  [Insert name 
of researcher] is working together with many other university professors who are carrying out 
the same kind of games all around the world. 
 
Before we proceed any further, let me stress something that is very important.  Many of you 
were invited here without understanding very much about what we are planning to do today.  If 
at any time you find that this is something that you do not wish to participate in for any reason, 
you are of course free to leave whether we have started the game or not. 
 
If you have heard about a game that has been played here in the past you should try to forget 
everything that you have been told.  This is a completely different game.    We are about to 
begin the game.  It is important that you listen as carefully as possible, because only people who 
understand the game will actually be able to play it.   [Insert name of researcher] will run 
through some examples here while we are all together.  You cannot ask questions or talk about 
the game while we are here together.  This is very important and please be sure that you obey 
this rule, because it is possible for one person to spoil the game for everyone, in which case we 
would not be able to play the game today.  Do not worry if you do not completely understand the 
game as we go through the examples here in the group.  Each of you will have a chance to ask 
questions in private with [insert name of researcher] to be sure that you understand how to play. 
 
TRUST GAME INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This game is played by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. 
Each of you will play this game with someone from your own village. However, none of you 
will know exactly with whom you are playing. Only [insert name of researcher] knows who is 
to play with whom and [he/she] will never tell anyone else.  
 
[Insert name of researcher] will give $4 to each Player 1 and another $4 to each Player 2. Player 
1 then has the opportunity to give a portion of their $4 to Player 2. They could give $4, or $3, or 
$2, or $1, or nothing. 
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 [Note:  It is important to allow only 5 options for dividing the money—this is to simplify the 
game and to create the same focal points across sites.]  
 
 Whatever amount Player 1 decides to give to Player 2 will be tripled by [insert name of 
researcher] before it is passed on to Player 2. Player 2 then has the option of returning any 
portion of this tripled amount to Player 1.  
 
 
Then, the game is over.  
 
 
 
Player 1 goes home with whatever he or she kept from their original $4, plus anything returned 
to them by Player 2. Player 2 goes home with their original $4, plus whatever was given to them 
by Player 1 and then tripled by [insert name of researcher], minus whatever they returned to 
Player 1. 
 
 
Here are some examples. 
 
 [You should work through these examples by having all the possibilities laid out in front of 
people, with Player 1’s options from $4 to $0 and a second column showing the effects of the 
tripling.  As you go through each example demonstrate visually what happens to the final 
outcomes for each Player.  Be careful to remind people that Player 2 always also has the 
original $4]:  
1. Imagine that Player 1 gives $4 to Player 2.  [Insert name of researcher] triples this amount, so 
Player 2 gets $12 (3 times $4 equals $12) over and above their initial $4. At this point, Player 
1 has nothing and Player 2 has $16.  Then Player 2 has to decide whether they wish to give 
anything back to Player 1, and if so, how much.  Suppose Player 2 decides to return $3 to 
Player 1.  At the end of the game Player 1 will go home with $3 and Player 2 will go home 
with $13. 
 
2. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives $3 to Player 2.  [Insert name of 
researcher] triples this amount, so Player 2 gets $9 (3 times $3 equals $9) over and above their 
initial $4. At this point, Player 1 has $1 and Player 2 has $13.  Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player, and if so, how much.  Suppose Player 2 
decides to return $0 to Player 1.  At the end of the game Player 1 will go home with $1 and 
Player 2 will go home with $13. 
 
 
 
 
3. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives $2 to Player 2.  [Insert name of 
researcher] triples this amount, so Player 2 gets $6 (3 times $2 equals $6) over and above their 
initial $4. At this point, Player 1 has $2 and Player 2 has $10.  Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so, how much.  Suppose Player 2 
decides to return $3 to Player 1.  At the end of the game Player 1 will go home with $5 and 
Player 2 will go home with $7. 
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4. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives $1 to Player 2.  [Insert name of 
researcher] triples this amount, so Player 2 gets $3 (3 times $1 equals $3) over and above their 
initial $4. At this point, Player 1 has $3 and Player 2 has $7.  Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so, how much.  Suppose Player 2 
decides to return $2 to Player 1.  At the end of the game Player 1 will go home with $5 and 
Player 2 will go home with $5. 
 
 
 
 
5. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives nothing to Player 2.  There is 
nothing for [insert name of researcher] to triple.  Player 2 has nothing to give back and the 
game ends here.  Player 1 goes home with $4 and Player 2 goes home with $4.  
 
 
 
Note that the larger the amount that Player 1 gives to player 2, the greater the amount that can be 
taken away by the two players together. However, it is entirely up to Player 2 to decide what he 
should give back to Player 1. The first player could end up with more than $4 or less than $4 as a 
result. 
 
 
We will go through more examples with each of you individually when you come to play the 
game. In the mean time, do not talk to anyone about the game. Even if you are not sure that you 
understand the game, do not talk to anyone about it. This is important. If you talk to anyone 
about the game while you are waiting to play, we must disqualify you from playing. 
 
[Bring in each Player 1 one by one.  Use as many of the examples below as necessary.] 
 
6. Imagine that Player 1 gives $4 to Player 2.  [Insert name of researcher] triples this amount, so 
Player 2 gets $12 (3 times $4 equals $12) over and above their initial $4. At this point, Player 1 
has nothing and Player 2 has $16.  Then Player 2 has to decide whether they wish to give 
anything back to Player 1, and if so, how much.  Suppose Player 2 decides to return $6 to Player 
1.  At the end of the game Player 1 will go home with $6 and Player 2 will go home with $10.   
 
 
7. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives $3 to Player 2.  [Insert name of 
researcher] triples this amount, so Player 2 gets $9 (3 times $3 equals $9) over and above their 
initial $4. At this point, Player 1 has $1 and Player 2 has $13.  Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player, and if so, how much.  Suppose Player 2 
decides to return $1 to Player 1.  At the end of the game Player 1 will go home with $2 and 
Player 2 will go home with $12.   
 
 
8. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives $2 to Player 2.  [Insert name of 
researcher] triples this amount, so Player 2 gets $6 (3 times $2 equals $6) over and above their 
initial $4. At this point, Player 1 has $2 and Player 2 has $10.  Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so, how much.  Suppose Player 2 
decides to return $0 to Player 1.  At the end of the game Player 1 will go home with $2 and 
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Player 2 will go home with $10.   
 
 
9. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives $1 to Player 2.  [Insert name of 
researcher] triples this amount, so Player 2 gets $3 (3 times $1 equals $3) over and above their 
initial $4. At this point, Player 1 has $3 and Player 2 has $7.  Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so, how much.  Suppose Player 2 
decides to return $2 to Player 1.  At the end of the game Player 1 will go home with $5 and 
Player 2 will go home with $5. 
 
 
10.   Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives nothing to Player 2.  There is 
nothing for [insert name of researcher] to triple.  Player 2 has nothing to give back and the 
game ends here.  Player 1 goes home with $4 and Player 2 goes home with $4.  
 
 
 
Now, can you work through these examples for me: 
 
 
11. Imagine that Player 1 gives $3 to Player 2. So, Player 2 gets $9 (3 times $3 equals $9) over 
and above their initial $4.  At this point, Player 1 has $1 and Player 2 has $13.  Suppose Player 
2 decides to return $5 to Player 1.  At the end of the game Player 1 will have how much? [the 
initial $4-$3 (given to Player 2)=$1+return from player 2 of $5=$6.  If they are finding it 
difficult, talk through the maths with them and be sure to use demonstration with the actual 
money].  And Player 2 will have how much?  
 
 
 
[Their original $4+$9 (after the tripling of the $3 sent by Player 1)-$5 they return to Player 
1=$8, if they are finding it difficult, talk through the maths with them].   
 
12. Imagine that Player 1 gives $1 to Player 2. So Player 2 gets $3 (3 times $1 equals $3) over 
and above their initial $4. Then, suppose that Player 2 decides to give $1 back to Player 1. At 
the end of the game Player 1 will have how much?   
 
 
 
 
 
[The initial $4-$1 (given to Player 2)=$3+return from player 2 of $1=$4.  If they are finding it 
difficult, talk through the maths with them and be sure to use demonstration with the actual 
money].  And Player 2 will have how much? [Their original $4+$6 (after the tripling of the $3 
sent by Player 1)-$1 they return to Player 1=$6, if they are finding it difficult, talk through the 
maths with them]. 
 
HOW TO PLAY THE GAME 
 
First player: You are Player 1. Here is your $4. [At this point $4 is placed on the table in front 
of the player.] While I am turned away, you must hand [insert researcher’s name] the amount of 
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money you want to be tripled and passed on to Player 2. You can give Player 2 nothing, $1, $2, 
$3, or $4. Player 2 will receive this amount tripled by me plus their own initial $4.  Remember 
the more you give to Player 2 the greater the amount of money at his or her disposal. While 
Player 2 is under no obligation to give anything back, we will pass onto you whatever he or she 
decides to return. [Now the player hands back whatever he or she wants to have tripled and 
passed to player 2.]   
 
 
 
 
 [Note to researcher:  Finish all Player 1’s and send them to a third holding location—they must 
not return to the group of Player 1’s who have not played and they must not join the Player 2’s.  
Once all Player 1’s have played you can begin to call Player 2’s.  Player 2’s can be paid off 
immediately after they play and sent home.] 
 
Second player:  You are Player 2. First, here is your $4. [Put the $4 in front of Player 2.] Let’s 
put that to one side. [Move the $4 to one side but leave it on the table.] This pile represents 
Player 1’s initial $4. [Put this $4 in front of the researcher.] Now [insert name of researcher] 
will show you how much Player 1 decided to give to you. Then [he/she] will triple it. Then you 
must hand back the amount that you want returned to Player 1. [Take Player 1’s offer out of the 
pile representing Player 1’s stake and put it down in front of Player 2, near but not on top of 
Player 2’s $4. Then add to Player 1’s offer to get the tripled amount. Receive back Player 2’s 
response.] Remember, you can choose to give something back or not. Do what you wish. While 
I am turned away, you must hand [insert researcher’s name] the amount of money you want to 
send back to Player 1.  [Now the player hands back his return for Player 1.]  You are now free 
to go home, but do not visit with any of the waiting players. 
 
 
  
